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Abstract 
*r 
Research was conducted with college students to 
determine the relationship of substages of moral judg- 
ment (A or.B), sex of subject, and type of task to the 
likelihood of participation in prosocial (altruistic) 
tasks. The tasks examined involved two levels of ex- 
penditure! a minimal-expenditure task (phone-assist) 
and a substantial-expenditure task (blood donation).' 
_^«julfs^indi^ 
does not appear to provide added motivation for parti- 
cipation in particular prosocial tasks. Furthermore, 
subjects are more likely to engage in prosocial tasks 
which do not require much effort. Finally, it appears 
that females who help respond more quickly than males 
who help in a minimal-expenditure task, while males 
are more likely than females to promise to engage in 
more demanding tasks but do not always keep their pro- 
mises. Implications for future research are discussed. 
«v 
CHAPTER 1 
SUBSTAGES OP MORAL JUDGMENT AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIORS 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Research within the field of moral judgment has 
been criticised for its failure to establish a relation- 
ship between stages of moral judgment and moral behavior. , 
The purpose of this research was to determine the rela- 
tionship of substages of moral judgment to the likeli- 
hood of participation in prosocial (altruistic) tasks. 
The two altrul8tlCT"tttSKB ^mimm^TiWmS/M''iM~TBy^^ot'^ 
expendituret  a minimal expenditure prosocial task (phone- 
assist) and a substantial expenditure prosocial task 
(blood donating). 
THE STAGE CONCEPT OF MORAL JUDGMENT 
One area of study which has been of great interest 
to cognitive-developmental researchers involves the onto- 
geny" of moral reasoning. This interest can be traced to 
the work of Piaget (1932) examining children's rule con- 
sciousness and rule obedience. Piaget (1932) defined 
moral judgments" as decisions involving the conflict of 
personal interests with the social obligations relevant 
to the situation in which a person finds himself. Piaget 
suggests that there are two types of judgment strategies 
which children use in making moral judgmentsi  cooperative 
morality strategies focusing upon societal obligations 
and constraints, and autonomous morality strategies 
focusing upon personally endorsed rules (Piaget, 1932)* 
Piaget stated that during development, a child passes 
through increasingly more advanced phases of moral judg- 
ment development. At first, the child is inundated by 
the externally defined dofs and don'ts which are repre- 
sented in fathers, mothers and other elders. As his cog- 
nitive processes develop, the child advances morally such 
that his own point of view becomes increasingly impbr- 
Jtent and J.a-4.nt«gM*edwir^hr#^ 
of others (Piaget, 1932). 
Lawrence Kohlberg (1958) subsequently expanded 
Piaget*8 ideas to provide the foundation for a more elab- 
orate six-stage theory of moral development. These six 
stages of moral development are grouped into three major 
levelsi The Preconventional level (Stages 1 and 2) at 
which rules and social expectations are viewed as being 
external to the person, the Conventional level (Stages 
3 and 4) at which the person has internalized social 
rules and expectations and the Postconventional level 
(Stages 5 and 6) at which the person differentiates 
himself from previously defined external rules thus 
following his own self-selected principles (Kohlberg, ' 
1976). 
Kohlberg (1976) further refined his theory of moral 
development by identifying specific substages, A and B, 
at each of the six stages of moral development (Kohlberg, 
1976i Kohlberg & Candee, 198l). Type A judgments are 
usually made in terms of the situational givens of an 
experience. These judgments are limited to the real. i.e. 
they appear to be rooted in the, action in question and 
the specific situational factors in which the subject is 
involved (Kohlberg &  Candee* 1981). 
Type B judgments, on the other hand, are distin- 
guished as an appeal to some universal standard. These 
.,. ^udgmen-ts^ ar#-4^ 
substage A judgments. In a sense, type B judgments re- 
flect both the specific situation and an appeal to a 
personal principle in moral judgment making. Type B 
judgments are considered to be,more reflective of moral 
obligation, duty and a sense of moral responsibility 
and hence, are' more motivating in relation to moral be- 
havior. Type B judgments are viewed as an attempt, at 
any stage, to articulate the principled, as opposed to 
the situational, point of view (Kohlberg &  Candee, 1981). 
An example illustrating the differences between 
substages A and B is helpful here. In a specific 
dilemma, a man, Heinz, has a wife who is dying. She needs 
a drug which the neighborhood druggist manufactures but 
is selling for ten times what it cost him to make. 
Heinz cannot raise the money to pay for the drug. Af- 
ter his appeal to the druggist for help fails, he breaks 
*fJV•t^(i-;t:tTe'^,'=Il^^*TW,' *?-7IT"IM-TM>-.'?JTVI 
into the store and steals the drug. When asked why 
Heinz should steal the drug, a person functioning at 
(i ■ ' 
Stage 4-A might replyi  "Because his wife can contribute 
to society and so her death would be a loss to us all as 
well as to Heinz." . This reply reflects the Stage 4- no- 
tion than an individual's life gains value though the 
functional contribution he can make to society. Thus, 
this reply is an appeal to the saved person's ability 
to contribute to society and to help in its advancement. 
„^,^r^apai^»t, f una-« 
answer that Heinz should save his wifei  "Because it's 
his duty and every individual in society has an obliga- 
tion to his fellow man as his helper." This reply re- > 
fleets the Stage 4- notion that saving a life provides 
social benefit however, going beyond the particular 
situation, it is also an appeal to the principle of the 
necessity of helping others as a generalized practice 
if humanity is to survive. 
The substage differences can be illustrated for 
Stage 3 as well. When asked why Heinz should steal the 
drug, a person functioning at Stage -3-A might replyt 
"Because if he doesn't save tais wife, his whole family 
will suffer." This reply reflects the Stage 3 concern 
for the welfare and feelings of others as members of a 
distinct social group but more specifically for the ef- 
fect the woman's death would have on her family. A 
* 
respondant functioning at Stage 3-B however, might reply 
that Heine should steal the drugs  "Because she's still 
a human and has just as much right to live as anyone 
else." This reply reflects the Stage 3 notion of con- 
cern for the wife but it is generalized to all human 
beings (all life is precious).. Thus, one may see that 
substage A judgments appear to be rooted in the parti- 
cular situation while substage B judgments extend be- 
yond the particular situation by making an appeal to 
.more_^\miyersji,l.,,..primjipJ,ea *....- ...,_.. .„..„...^.....,.,.,...,-_:,1.^w.if.(.,.^-,.  
Stage Sequences " Kohlberg (1958) postulated that 
the sequence of. moral development is a fixed, upward pro- 
gression through these six stages toward a level of prin- 
cipled moral judgments. Furthermore, the six stages form 
an invariable hierarchy, that is, the higher stages are 
extensions of the lower stages such that elements of 
lower stages are present in integrated forms at the high- 
er levels (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). 
Current research is generally consistent with the 
notion of a fixed sequence of stages during moral devel- 
opment for subjects in Britain and the U.S.A. (Beloff & 
Patron, 1979)» among U.S.A. and Brazilian children, 
adolescents and adults (Biaggio, 1975* 1976), among 
Turkish children, adolescents and adults (Turiel, Kohl- 
berg & Edwards, 1978) and among Indian and American 
children, adolescents and adults (Parikh, 1980). However, 
one may not conclude irrevocably that moral judgment 
development proceeds in an invariant sequencing of stages 
since work with Nigerian boys by Maqsud (1979) and re- 
search among adqlescents educated in Israel and the Soviet 
Union by Ziv, Shani and Nebenhaus (1975) failed to find 
support for a culturally insensitive sequence of stages 
of morffl'development. 
Age Trends  Attainment of stages in mbral devel- 
opment also appears to be an age-related process. The 
j«aiiabla-.re^arch^ 
postconventional stages of moral reasoning among adult 
subjects and preconventional/conventional stages of 
moral reasoning among children and adolescent subjects 
(Denny &  Duffy, 1974j Holstein, 1976| Kohn, 1976| Rest, 
1975; Rest, Davison 4 Robbins, 1978| Weiner, 1977» White, 
1975). 
Stage Hierarchies  Research has also addressed the 
nqtion that stages of moral judgment form an invariable 
hierarchy. Generally, research supports the assertion 
of the hierarchical nature of the six stages (Kohlberg, 
19731 Turiel, 1969. 1974, 19771 Wonderly-& Kupfersmid, 
1978). However, speculation exists concerning stage 
regression during the early college years (Kohlberg & 
Kramer, 1969). 
COGNITIVE FACTORS IK MORAL JUDGMENT 
Age trends in moral judgment stage attainment have 
7 ' S 
required researchers to clarify the relationship be- 
tween the development of cognitive functions and the 
development of moral judgment. Since moral reasoning 
is a cognitive process, more abstractive forms of moral 
reasoning should be associated with more abstractive 
cognitive processes in general. Indeed, higher stages 
of cognitive 'development have been correlated with post- 
conventional levels of moral development (Campagna & 
Harter, 19751 Faust &  Arbuthnot, 19781 Gold, 1975; Harris, 
^USSerrfc-lfufS & Prentice; 1977» 
Langford_& George, 1975I Mitchell, 1975i Tomlinson- 
Keasey &  Keasey, 1972, 1974; Verma, 1975). 
Formal Operational Cognition  The Piagetian cog- 
nitive stage of Formal Operations has been identified as 
a contributive factor in the attainment of higher stages 
of moral reasoning. Formal operational reasoning is 
characterized by hypothetical-deductive thinking during 
which a thinker has the ability to consider all possible 
solutions to a problem before acting on any one of those 
solutions (Piaget, 1950). The Piagetian cognitive stage 
of Formal Operations has been identified as a necessary 
prerequisite to postconventional levels of moral reason- 
ing although attainment of Formal Operations is no guar- 
antee of higher levels of moral judgment (Kuhn, Kohl- 
berg & Haan, 1977). 
Centratlon  Centration refers to the process by 
which a child considers himself the focal point of his 
8 
world s decentration refers to the gradual awareness of 
"the roles of others in the child's life (Piaget, 1950). 
Decentration is positively correlated with moral stage 
attainment such that the more decentered an individual, 
■the higher the stage of moral reasoning he attains 
(Gottlieb, Taylor &  Ruderman, 19771 Nelson, 19801  Rot- 
tenberg, 1980| Takahashi, 19721 Walker, 1980). 
Thus, research suggests that moral judgment does 
have cognitive underpinnings. Yet, it has also been 
:d^iirffie?"that¥o« de- 
velopment are not sufficient explanations Of moral stage 
advancement. 
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL FACTORS IN MORAL REASONING 
Different subject populations have been compared in 
order* to establish the generalizability of findings in 
moral judgment research. Studies have yielded mixed 
results. 
Sex Differences  A prominent research question in- 
volves the concern of whether or not moral reasoning 
is different in males and females. A review of the 
available research leads to inconclusive findings. 
Keasey (1972), Turiel (1976) and Garwood, Levine and 
Ewing (1980) found no sex differences in moral reasoning 
stage attainment. Additional studies conducted by 
Wersbroth (1970), Hoffman (1979)» Orchowsky and Jenkins, 
(1979) and Bussey and Maughan (1982) found male superior 
results., However, androgynous self-image appears to 
be related to higher levels of moral judgment in both 
sexes (Leahy &  Eiter, 1980). 
Other researchers have suggested that sex and 
cultural biases are built into the Kohlberg system of 
moral judgment--analysis. It is suggested further that 
sex and cultural biases negatively affect assessment of 
judgment levels of women and of members of lower class- 
es (Gilligan, 1977, 19811  Grover, 198O1 Sams,, 1975i 
Trainer, 1977).   '. „_ .__ ,_.„_.=_„„^™™_^~^^ 
Moral Judgment Among Juvenile Delinquents The tern 
juvenile delinquent rises primarily from a legal pro- 
cess and refers^ to a juvenile. J*ho commits an act that is 
illegal and one which the youth knows is illegal at the 
time he or she commits it (Gold, 1970» Gold & Mann, 1972). 
Research questions involve the notion that persons who 
engage in illegal/immoral behaviors may have funda- 
mentally different moral judgment processes than those 
persons who do not engage in illegal or immoral behaviors. 
In general, juvenile delinquent^subjects attain lower 
levels of moral judgment than matched non-delinquent 
cohorts*(Fodor, 1973i Hains &  Miller, 1980j Jurkovic, 
1980j Prentice & Jurkovic, 1973)_^ Furthermore, training 
programs in moral reasoning nave been found to have a 
positive effect upon the development of moral judgment 
within delinquent subpopulations (Sequin-Tremblay & 
10 
Klely, l?79i Rosenkoetter, Landman & Mazak, 198O). Thus 
the research appears to suggest that the moral judgment 
processes among delinquents may not toe fundamentally 
different from those of non-delinquent cohorts. How- 
ever, these processes do appear to develop more slowly 
among delinquents. Progress through the Stages of moral 
development msty be positively influenced by selected 
moral education programs. 
Mental Health States and Moral Judgment  Investi- 
gators in the field of moral Judgment have also been 
concerned with the particular relationship between men- 
tal health and moral judgment processes. Particular 
'1 
interest has focused upon effects of mental health/illness 
upon stage attainment in moral judgment. Research con-, 
r 
cerning moral judgment processes of college students who 
had been plpyohotherapeutic clients and matched non- 
client cohorts indicates thait there were no differences 
i ; * 
in the levels of moral judgments made by these groups 
1 
(Sieveking,. Harrison, Ackerman & Gorsuch,, 1971). Benson 
(1980) established that schizophrenic subjects achieve 
• ■  . i r        -1 
lower stages of moral - judgment than normal matched con- 
trols! however, Wonderly and Kupfersmid (1979) found 
that moral judgment levels could not be used to,predict 
normal or abnormal mental states. Additional research 
with mentally retarded subjects indicated that mentally 
f! 
retarded individuals tend to achieve lower levels of 
11 
moral development than normal subjects'(Blakey, 19731 
Miller, Zumoff & Stephens, 197*0. Thus, a summary of 
available research indicates that persons experiencing 
mental disturbances or deficiencies may attain lower 
levels of moral development than normal subjects. 
'While research has indicated that there are no 
well-defined personality traits that determine one's 
moral judgment strategies, some relationships between 
the two have been suggestsd (Pease, 1970). This pro- 
posed *»«la*ir0nahi}r- httS-prwlOW Mii^^^iJmToFr^^ktth 
concerning personal and social factors in moral reason- 
ing. 
Locus of Control  One possible contributing factor 
in moral judgment making may be locus of control. The 
theory of locus of control refers to the hypothesis that 
persons may have different beliefs concerning what forces 
ultimately control their lives (Rotter, 1971)• Persons 
demonstrating what is termed an internal locus of con- 
trol conceive that it is they who control their behaviors 
while persons who demonstrate an external locus of con- 
trol attribute control of their behavior to forces ex- 
corpora such as fate, God, significant others, etc. 
Specific research findings suggest that persons demon- 
strating a high level of internal locus of control may 
be more likely to attain higher levels of moral reason- 
ing than persons demonstrating a high level of external' 
12 
locus of control since external locus persons would 
tend to accept authority unquestioningly. Yet, research 
attending to the basic differentiation between internal 
and external locus of control has yielded contradictory 
results concerning the relationship between locus of 
control and levels of moral development. At times, 
positive"relationships were found between levels of 
moral development and internal locus of control (Bloom- 
berg, 1974i Bloomberg & Soneson, 1976). Upon other oc- 
...oa^on»^^ii^-si-eiTi'fli»nt^re;lHtl'0fESn]rp8" Be 'tween" moral 
judgment and locus of control were established (Janzen & 
Boersma, 1976).  Factor analytic studies revealed posi- 
tive relationships between levels of moral development 
and internal locus of control in socio-political factors 
(eg. selection of political representatives who carry 
out the wishes of the electorate) among males and high 
levels of internal locus of control in relation to glo- 
bal factors (eg. control over relationships) among women 
(Connolly & McCarrey, 1978). Thus, it appears that some 
personal internally-directed control disposition may 
be related to the attainment of higher levels of moral 
judgment even though stable trends have yet to be es- 
tablished. 
Parenting and Moral Development  In addition to 
the influences of possible personality traits on moral 
judgment behavior; parent/child relationships and parenting 
13 
strategies appear to play a sizeable role in the devel- 
opment of moral reasoning.  It has been hypothesized that 
particular parenting strategies are more conducive to 
the attainment of higher levels of moral judgment. 
Researchers have found positive correlations between 
levels of moral development and close parent/child 
identification (Wersbroth, 1970). Similarly, Podor 
(1973) found that children who are exposed to nurturant 
parents tend to attain higher levels of moral judgment 
and Parish (1980) showed that children from unbroken 
homes appear to attain higher levels of moral judgment 
-than children from single-parent homes.  Furthermore, 
Hoffman (1979) revealed that parents who practice in- 
ductive discipline (i.e. who set rules and guidelines 
for the consistent dissemination of punishment) tend 
-to have children who attain higher levels of moral 
judgment.  Finally, children whose parents encourage 
discussion of moral views and reasons upon which decisions 
are based tend to attain higher levels of moral judg- 
ment than children from autocratic homes (Holstein, 1972). 
Hence, it appears that parenting styles and parent/child 
interactions do have a significant effect upon moral 
judgment development. 
Social Status and Moral Judgment  Researchers have 
suggested that particular socio-political issues may 
14 
exert an influence on moral judgments within the Kohl- 
berg ideology. Keasey (1971) found that persons who 
actively engage in political behaviors (rally, lobby, 
etc.) tend to attain higher levels of moral judgment 
than persons who are not politically active. Furthermore, 
political liberalism correlates positively with higher 
levels of moral judgment within the Kohlberg frame- 
work (Fishkin, Keniston & McKinnon, 1973). Kohlberg 
(1969) also demonstrated that persons from higher 
socio-economic groups attain higher. leyeJUs. of mpra-1- - 
judgment than those of lower economic groups. Thus 
it appears that levels of moral judgment are sensitive 
-to social status and political activism. 
i 
MORAL JUDGMENT AND MORAL BEHAVIOR 
Much effort has been expended to understand the 
structural, personality, social and cognitive variables 
related to the making of moral judgments. However, the 
issue most Salient to this research involves the rela-, 
tionship between moral judgment and behavior, specif37- 
cally the- correspondence between moral development and 
prosocial (altruistic) behaviors. Differentiating 
stages or substages of moral development may be an 
interesting academic exercise, but does it allow us 
to predict actual behavior? 
An extensive review of moral judgment and behavioral 
research was compiled by Blasi (1980). He concluded that 
while the majority of available research studies appear 
to support a positive correlation between levels of 
moral judgment and engaging in moral behavior, the stud- 
ies differ greatly in reference to their underlying 
assumptions concerning the nature of moral judgments, 
the selected measurement instruments and the different 
definitions provided for the behaviors being ^examined 
(Blasi, 1980). It appears at this point that the field 
is in need of research directed to seeking conclusive 
statements concerning the nature and the extent of the 
relationship between levels of moral judgment and 
specific behaviors. Acts of kindness, sharing, helping 
and restraining from hurting are the current topics 
appearing within the altruism-moral development re- 
search arena (Blasi, 198O). 
However, to date most research concerning moral 
development and altruistic behavior has focused upon 
incidences of the behaviors noted above without probing 
for an understanding of the role of stages of moral 
judgment as motivational "why" factors in behaving al- 
truistically (Krebs, 1970, 1978).  In research inves- 
tigating the relationship between moral judgment and 
prosocial behavior, Levin and Bekerman-Greenberg (1979) 
found that this relationship is dependent upon the level 
of correspondence between the content of the judgment 
and behavior dilemmas used in the research. Their results 
16 
led Levin and Bekerman-Greenberg (1979) to suggest that 
moral judgments and moral behaviors may be situationally 
content-specific rather than demonstrations of a cogni- 
tive structure of moral development. Conversely, al- 
most all other researchers who have pursued the rela- 
tionship between levels of moral judgment and prosocial 
(altruistic) behaviors have obtained positive correla- 
tions between levels of moral judgment and frequency of 
engaging in prosocial (altruistic) behaviors. Emler 
. and J^^ 
correlated with age and may be attributed to develop- 
(r 
mental transformations in children's conceptions of 
distributive justice (i.e. maturing from making judgments 
of punishment based solely on a unidimensional aspect 
of the amount of damage done to making judgments of 
punishment based upon an evaluation of intentions, rules 
and consequences). Rubin and Schneider (1973) found a 
direct relationship between a decrease in egocentrism 
(decentering) and an increase in incidences of candy 
or ticket donating behaviors among seven year old sub- 
jects. Halisch and Hoffman (1980) investigated the re- 
lationship between levels of moral development, role- 
taking ability and donating behaviors of eight and nine 
year old subjects finding positive correlations be- 
tween the ability to decenter and take a needy person's 
role and incidences of donating. No significant rela- 
tionships were established between levels of moral 
17 
judgment and role-taking ability (Halisch ic  Hoffman, 
1980), Thus, while findings are indeed mixed, there 
does appear to be a positive relationship between moral 
judgment and moral behaviors. 
Cognitive Developmental Theory and Altruism  The 
cognitive developmental theory of prosocial (altruistic) 
behavior can be construed as a theory of personal nor- 
mative control of altruistic behaviors, altruistic being 
defined as those actions which benefit a needy recipient 
without benefjU Jp^ ^ 
donor (Schwartz, 1970, 1973, 1977). Within the cognitive- 
developmental framework, prosocialism (altruism) is con- 
sidered a product of developing cognitive processes much 
like moral judgments (Krebs, 19781 Nagel, 1970). Con- 
ceptions of altruism change as cognitive development 
advances (Kohlberg, 1969» Krebs, 1978j Rosenhan, 1978). 
However, this does not necessarily imply that quantity 
of altruistic behaviors should increase with moral devel- 
opment.  Rather, as moral development progresses through 
a more complex integration of individual principles 
with the needs, rights and duties of others, so too may 
the quality of prosocial (altruistic) behavior become 
more complex (Krebs, 1978). Nor does it follow that 
higher levels of moral development serve as the sole 
motivators to engaging in prosocial (altruistic) behaviors.. 
To help or not to help is a decision which also calls 
18 
into examination the relational proximity of the donor 
to the recipient. Blum (1980) has demonstrated that 
subjects are more likely to help members of their im- 
mediate families or close friends than to help strangers. 
Furthermore, need perception and cost assessment appear 
to influence the likelihood of engaging in prosocial (al- 
truistic) behaviors. Wagner and Wheeler (1969) and 
Schwartz (1973) demonstrated that persons are more like- 
ly to help a needy recipient if the need can be satis- 
fied by their efforts (i.e. if the task is not too far 
beyond their capacities as in the case of a small female 
trying to lift a 200 lb. person from a burning car) 
and that persons are .more likely to assist"others if 
their efforts will not be too costly to them in terms 
of time, energy or monetary contribution. Hoffman 
(1976) revealed that persons demonstrating higher levels 
of religious guilt were more likely to engage in altru- 
istic behaviors, perhaps as acjts of retribution. Finally, 
Gross, Wallston and Piliavin (1975) demonstrated that 
people a,re more likely to assist attractive beneficiar- 
ies than unattractive beneficiaries. 
The extent of the motivational role of moral de- 
velopment in altruistic behavior is as yet untappeUv 
It may be that engaging in a prosocial (altruistic) act 
is best understood in terms of a step-wise progression 
through several decision-making stages in which the actor 
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perceives the need of the other, activates cognitive 
and moral structures to which he references the pos- 
sible actions and outcomes, reviews defenses (weighs 
costs and benefits) and engages in action or inaction 
(Schwartz, 1973). 
THE KOHLBERG STANDARD ISSUE SCORING SYSTEM 
Kohlberg believed that it would be possible, 
using Piagetian interview techniques and well-defined 
moral dilemmas to identify a person's level of moral 
judgment. Research with his nine original dilemmas and 
probe questions led to the development of a Sentence 
and Story Scoring System (Kohlberg, 1958), a Structural 
Issue Scoring System (Kohlberg, 1969) and thef'latest 
Standard Issue Scoring System (Colby, et al., 1980). 
Revisions were intended to secure validation and re- 
liability in the latest instrument while dealing with 
subjectivity anomalies which had come to light in earlier 
versions through current research (Colby, 1981). Re- 
sults of longitudinal analysis with the Standard Issue 
Scoring System (Kohlberg & Colby, in press) reveal 
high test-retest, form A-B reliability, high levels of 
construct validity and internal consistency. 
Use of the Kohlberg Interview requires training 
which may be attained at the Harvard Center for Moral 
Education or from a practicing interviewer/scorer and 
restricts a researcher to limiting sample sire in light 
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of the administration find scoring time involved (ap- 
proximately one and one half hours per protocol). The 
Standard Issue Interview consists of two alternate 
forms (Form A and Porn B)» Each form contains three 
moral dilemmas about which a subject answers a set of 
prescribed questions. Form C of the Standard Issue 
Interview is currently undergoing revision and is not 
available for research manipulations at this time. 
Work by Kurtines and Grief (1974) outlined the 
scoring and reliability deficiencies encountered when 
using the earliest two versions of the Kohlberg inter- 
view scoring systems. These deficiencies appeared to 
arise out of the wide latitude" and subjectivity allowed 
within the Sentence and Story and Structural Issue 
systems. Criticisms of subjectivity were resolved in 
the 1979 revision of the Standard Issue Scoring System 
which objectifies the scoring process (Colby, et al., 
1980). 
McKechie (1971) addressed the question of insensi- 
tivity of the Kohlberg interview to transformations 
in dilemma content, finding that subjects were more 
likely to be judged at a more mature level of moral 
judgment when the dilemmas were revised to contrast 
purposive with accidental aots. Additional research 
by Armsby (1971) indicated that subjects were more 
likely to attain higher levels of moral judgment when 
exposed to purposive acts (growth about £ to 1 stage). 
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In further attempts to test the content-speci- 
ficity sensitivity of moral judgment assessment, Levine 
(1976) hypothesized that by varying the identity of the 
protagonist within the dilemmas, a subject's stage of 
moral development would fluctuate, depending upon the 
degree of relationship of the protagonist and the sub- 
ject. Results of the study indicate that when the pro- 
tagonist was presented as a subject's significant other. 
Stage 3 response rate increased and Stage k  response 
rate decreased! this implies regression from Stage 4, 
reasoning when a family member or friend protagonist 
is involved in dilemmas. It may be that such a protago- 
nist (significant other) focuses attention upon a per- 
son's immediate social group rather than on the society 
at large. While such results raise questions concern- 
ing the insensitivity of the hierarchy component of this 
stage theory in relation to cross-situational variables, 
replication and extensions of the research among other 
populations (adults and children as opposed to college 
freshmen) are required before definitive statements can 
be made. 
Nesdale, Rule and McAra (1975) manipulated the 
/ i 
attractiveness of the protagonist and the quality of 
his intentions (good versus bad) in the original Kohl- 
berg dilemmas. Results did not indicate any significant 
effects for attractiveness however, positive intent 
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was associated with higher levels of moral judgment* 
Thus, summarizing, it should be noted that while efforts 
have been made to restructure stage analysis and scoring 
procedures in the Kohlberg interview (Colby, et al., 1980), 
subtle differences in moral dilemma content may have an 
effect upon assessed stages of moral development, a 
concern in generalizing results obtained from research 
utilizing this tool. 
The Kohlberg interview has been compared to other 
measures of moral judgment. It was positively correlated 
with the Hoffman Social-Learning Orientation Scale 
(Gash, 1979)» the Maitland-Goodman Objective Moral Judg- 
ment Scale (Bode & Page, 1978i Wilmoth & McParland, 1977)» 
the Hogan Maturity .of Moral Judgment Scale (Wilmoth & 
McParland, 1977i Tsujimoto &  Nardi, 1978) and the Rest 
Defining Issues Test (Proming &  McColgan, 1979f Rest, 
197^. 1975). Thus it appears that the Kohlberg inter- 
view provides analysis of moral development consistent 
with other measures available in the field. An interest- 
ing controversy centers around exactly what these scales 
are measuring. Those here mentioned follow a theory 
of justice moralityi alterations of the basic concept of 
moral judgment development (for examplei the develop- 
ing capacity to take another's social role) may affect 
the value of the present measures (Gilligan, 1981). 
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HYPOTHESES 
The stated purpose  of this  research was to es- 
tablish the effects  of substages   of moral  judgment, 
sex of subject and  task type  upon  the   likelihood of a 
subject to engage  in prosocial   (altruistic) behaviors. 
The following hypotheses were  proposed! 
1.    Persons assessed  to demonstrate substage B 
reasoning will be more  likely  to  engage in prosocial 
tasks  than  persons  demonstrating  substage A reason- 
ing. ■ " ." 
As was indicated above,  within the Kohlbergian 
framework of moral  judgment,   substage  B  judgment pro- 
cesses are perceived  to be more motivating to moral 
behaviors than substage A processes.     Therefore,  if B 
processes are more motivating with  regards to likelihood 
to participate in moral behaviors,   subjects demonstrat- 
ing B reasoning will be more likely to   engage in pro- 
social tasks than subjects demonstrating substage A 
reasoning*    There is no current data base which demon- 
strates this trend,  however,   reevaluation of the moral 
judgment profiles of the Berkeley  sit-in demonstrators 
and non-demonstrators with the  Standard  Issue Scoring 
System indicates that persons who  used   substage B reason-, 
ing processes were more likely  to  protest by joining a 
sit-in than persons demonstrating substage A processes 
(Kohlberg & Candee,  1981). 
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2. All subjects will be more likely to engage in 
a minimal-expenditure prosoclal task than in a 
substantial-expenditure prosoclal task. 
Research by Gross, Wallston and Piliavin (1975). 
Schaps (1972), Schopler and Bateson (1965) and Wagner 
and Wheeler (1969) has demonstrated that cost in amount 
of physical.energy* finances or time is-negatively cor- 
related with the likelihood to engage in prosoclal be- 
haviors (eg. the help given to a person-in-need decreases 
as the costs involved in giving the help rise). 
3. Females will be more likely than males to 
engage in the phone-assist task. 
Research by Gilligan (1977 * 1981) indicates that 
females are more likely to take the role of the person 
in need. That is, females put themselves in the needy 
person's shoes more Quickly than males and therefore 
may be more heavily influenced to give assistance in 
this quick task than males who do not participate in 
this role-taking behavior as rapidly. 
Most of the experiments investigating the effect 
of sex of helper in nonemergency situations found that 
females are in general more likely to help than males 1 
however, the type of task required has differential 
effects upon the participation rates of males and females 
(Gaertner &  Bickman, 19711 Pomazal &  Clore, 19731 Wispe & 
Preshley, 1971). It may be that prosocial (altruistic) 
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tasks requiring greater physical effort or those, ih- 
congruent with the females' chosen social roles may be 
more costly to perform to the females and therefore 
less likely to elicit female help. With this thought 
in mind and with consideration, of the second hypothesis, 
it is further proposed that 
^. Male subjects will be more likely than female 
subjects to engage in the substantial expenditure 
task. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE RESEARCH 
METHOD 
Study 1 The purpose of this study was to pre- 
screen a minimal expenditure prosocial task in an ef- 
fort to establish the percentage of subjects who assist. 
Minimal expenditure is- here defined as a telephone-assist 
task requiring a scan and hand-to behavior lasting no 
more than one minute. The researcher hoped for a fifty 
percent response-assist rate since this would be most 
/■•■■ v 
useful in the experiment proper. ""   -■-■■ 
Sub.iects The subjects were 19 undergraduate stu- 
.dents (10 male, 9 female) drawn from the research sub- 
ject pool of introductory psychology students at Lehigh 
University. The mean ages of the subjects were 19.35 
and 19.5 years for males and females respectively. 
Materials 
School Attitude Questionnaire  The attitude 
questionnaire is a verbally administered series of 
twenty-five informal statements expressing opinions 
concerning school life, work, assignments and perceptions 
of teachers' attitudes to which the subject is to reply 
true or false as is indicative of his general position 
concerning the statements read to him. The questionnaire 
served as a distractor item within the phone-assist 
scenario and was not scored. 
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Telephone A standard Office telephone was attached 
to a 9 volt, foot-operated power switch which could 
trigger the telephone intercom to buz?, giving the im- 
pression of an in-coming call. 
Other Materials Two standard office desks, chairs 
and a variety of books, desk articles and decorative 
figurines, photos, etc. 
Procedure 
Each subject met individually with the experimenter 
for a twenty-minute session during which the experimenter 
verbally administered the attitude questionnaire. Dur- 
ing the administration of the questionnaire, the follow- 
ing procedure was maintainedi 
The experimenter introduced herself, asked the 
subject's age, class and academic major and stated that 
the purpose of this meeting was to establish student 
attitudes concerning the academic and social atmosphere 
among Lehigh students. Subjects were informed that it 
was an anonymous questionnaire after which they were in- 
structed to respond true or false to each statement 
read to them. 
Following the administration of the tenth ques- 
tionnaire item, the experimenter, without the subject's 
knowledge, triggered, the phone intercom to busz. The 
"telephone dall" was ostensibly from a "student" seek- 
ing information cpncerning a course pre-requisite for a 
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clinical psychology course being offered during the 
next semester.  In response, the experimenter stated 
that she would need the University catalog to answer 
the question of the alleged advisee.  (The catalog had 
been placed within view and reach of the subject but 
beyond easy reach of the experimenter.) Placing the 
phone receiver on the desk, the experimenter remarkedi 
"I know that catalog is in this mess someplace," and 
made a visual and manual search of her cluttered desk 
surface from left to right (duration 15 seconds). The 
experimenter then rose from her desk chair and visually 
scanned the subject's cluttered seating area which was 
at a desk parallel to the experimenter's. The subject's 
desk area was then manually scanned from right to left 
(duration 15 seconds).  If the subject had not yet 
handed the catalog to the experimenter, the experi- 
menter leaned over both desks to retrieve the catalog 
from its position in the far left of the experimental 
area (see Figure 1). 
Catalog Subject Jr 
Figure 1. Desk and catalog layout for phone task. 
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Having retreived the catalog, the experimenter answered 
the "caller's" question, completed administration of 
the survey and debriefed the subject as to the actual 
purpose of the screening task. 
Results Six of the ten male subjects and four of 
the nine female subjects responded to the phone-assist 
task by handing the catalog to the experimenter. A jC 
analysis revealed that there was clearly no statistical 
difference from a fifty percent response rate,X * »052, 
p>.05. This indicated that the phon,e-assist task would 
be a useful minimal-expenditure prosocial task. 
0  Study 2 
Subjects The subjects for this study were 100 
undergraduate students (50 male, 50 female) drawn from 
the research subject pool of introductory psychology 
and social relations students at Lehigh University. The 
male subjects averaged 19.10 and female subjects 19*60 
years of age, * 
Materials 
pornographic Data Sheet Students were required to 
complete a questionnaire survey which provided personal 
information as to age, sex, place in" sibling order, 
religious affiliation, parental educational background, 
voting registration and favorite, pasttimes (see Appendix l). 
Health Data Sheet Students were required to respond 
verbally and in writing to a series of health related 
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questions designed to determine their physical health 
status at the time of the interview. The questions 
were drawn from the health survey questionnaire adminis- 
tered by the American Red Cross to screen blood donors 
(see Appendix l). 
Moral Judgment Interview The Kohlberg Moral Judg- 
ment interview Form A was administered to' assess level 
and substage of the subject's moral development. The 
Form A responses were scored according to the Standard 
Issue Scoring system and provides a stage Sscore of 
moral development, a substage of either type A or type B. 
It requires that the subjects be read three moral di- 
lemmas in a clinical interview setting. Subjects are 
then asked to respond to questions about those dilemmas. 
Transcriptions of the subjects' recorded responses were 
scored individually by the researcher (see Appendix 1). 
Prosocial Tasks Subjects were exposed to the fol- 
lowing prosocial tasks which were selected as represent- 
ative examples of minimal-expenditure and substantial- 
expenditure taskst 
Task li The Minimal-expenditure Task. The ex- 
perimenter used the prescreened phone-assist task of 
Study 1 as an example of a simple act of assistance re- 
quiring minimal physical effort which extended no long- 
er than a minute in time and which benefitted the receiver 
without any benefit to the donor. 
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Task 2i The Substantial-expenditure Task* The 
experimenter used a blood donation task as an example 
of a substantial act of assistance requiring extended 
physical elfort (make appointment, go to donation cen- 
ter, give blood). This task involved approximately two 
hours in time and benefitted the receiver (the blood 
bank) without any benefit to the donor who supplied a 
physical body product (the blood). In essence, the 
subject was asked to be a blood donor to the Miller 
Memorial Blood Bank at his/her convenience. 
The phone-assist task was scored as followsi 
2 — handed the catalog to the experimenter fol- 
lowing first 15 second cue or before 15 sec- 
onds had. elapsed. 
1 — handed the catalog to the experimenter fol- 
lowing the second 15 second cue or after 15 
seconds but before 30 seconds had ela'psed. 
0 — did not hand the catalog to the experimenter. 
The blood donation task was scored as followsi 
2 — donated blood at a promised appointment. 
1 — failed to keep a promised appointment. 
0 — refused to donate blood.        • I 
Procedure The research was conducted in three 
phases as outlined belowi 
Phase 1 The subjects met with a confederate (One 
of two female senior undergraduates) in small groups ti 
complete the personal data questionnaire and health 
data questionnaire and to schedule an individual one-hour 
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interview with the experimenter.     Upon   completion of 
Phase 1,  eleven subjects had to be dismissed for health 
purposes.     Health purposes are here defined as the in- 
* ability to donate blood because of a  physical anomaly, 
infectious disease,  pregnancy,  allergy,   prescribed 
medication or because the subject did  not meet the 
weight criteria established by the blood bank.    The re- 
maining eighty-nine subjects  (45 female,   ¥*■ male)  en- 
gaged in Phase 2 of the study. 
Phase 2    During the one-hour interview,   the fol- 
lowing procedures were used for each of  the eighty- 
nine subjects.    The experimenter introduced herself and 
asked the subject to be seated in the  designated area 
(see Pigure  1).     Following introductions,   the experi- 
menter explained that the purpose of the   interview was 
to develop an understanding of the different cognitive 
strategies that people use when making  a  decision. 
The experimenter then reviewed  the   ten items from 
the demographic data sheet and the  firs-t   item of the 
health questionnaire.    Following the subject's response 
to the health question item,  the experimenter triggered 
the phone intercom to buzz and engaged   in the phone- 
assist procedure as outlined in Study  1 »     Upon retrieving 
the catalog,   the experimenter answered   -the alleged ad- 
visee's question and completed the review of the remain-       » 
ing items on the health data questionnaire with the subject. 
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Concluding the data review, the experimenter stated 
that it appeared everything was in order and that they 
would proceed to the judgment interview. The experimenter 
then  made a left to right visual and manual search of 
her desk area at which time she "discovered" a note which 
had been sent to her from the recruiting office of the 
Miller Memorial Blood Bank requesting donations.  The 
experimenter explained that the Bank, which relies 
heavily upon student donations, was in need of donations 
with the coming Christmas holiday season. The recruiter 
knew that she, the experimenter, had access to students 
and requested that she recruit donors. The experimenter 
then asked the subject if he or she would volunteer to 
donate a pint of blood, stating that this was neither a 
part of their role as a member of the subject pool nor 
a part of the judgment interview. If the subject agreed 
to donate blood, the experimenter gave him/her the phone 
number of the bank appointment office and also provided 
directions to the bank. If the subject refused to do- 
nate blood, the experimenter requested that the subject 
encourage anyone (s)he knew who was a donor to donate 
at this time. Putting the memo from the blood bank aside, 
the experimenter instructed the subject that they would 
engage in a discussion~style interview during which the 
experimenter would read several short stories. The sub- 
ject was requested to respond verbally to questions con- 
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ceming the behaviors of the stories* protagonists, given 
that there were no correct or incorrect responses. The 
experimenter explained that the interview would be taped 
to facilitate response analysisj however* to preserve 
anonymity, each subject was assigned a random subject 
number for the taped conversation. 
Following the Kohlberg interview, the experimenter 
thanked and dismissed each subject. 
Phase 3 Each subject was debriefed by means of 
a telephone1 conversation at which time the experimenter 
requested the date and time of the volunteer subjects* 
blood donation appointments. Subjects were then mailed 
formal written debriefing statements. Scheduled appoint- 
ments were verified with the Miller Blood Bank. Pol- 
lowing confirmation of donation appointments, subject 
names and phone numbers were deleted from the data bank, 
leaving only the random subject numbers for purposes 
of analysis. 
Results 
pistribution of Subjects by Stapes of Moral Judgment 
The Kohlberg interviews were scored according to the 
Standard Issue Scoring system. Frequency distributions of 
♦ 
subjects by stage and substage of moral judgment indi- 
cates similar stage distributions among males and fe- 
males within each substage (see Table l). 
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Table li Distribution of male and female subjects by 
Stages and Substages of Moral Judgment 
!3 
I 
MALES FEMALES 
SUBSTAGE A B A B 
•  1 
1(2) 
i/2 1 
2(1) " 
2 
2(3) 1 
2/3 2 1 1 2 
3(2) 1. 2 1 
3 6 3 6 6 
3(4) 1 1 
3/4 l 1 3 4 
4(3) ^ 2 3 
4 ^ 5 10 7 
4(5) 
4/5 3 3 1 1 
5(4) • 1 1 
5 1 1 
5(6) 
5/6 
6(5) 
' 
6 
Totals 24 20 
V 
ZZ               23 
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Prosocial Tasks Data from each prosocial task 
(see Table 2 and Table 3) were submitted to 2 (sex of 
subject) by 2 (substage of moral judgment) fixed effects 
unweighted means analyses of variance. 
Table 2i Mean assistance scores for sex of sub- 
ject and moral judgment substage in the 
phone-assist task (Scores « 0,1,2). 
Substage A Substage B 
Males 0.958 0.950 
n = 24 n » 20 
Females 1.500 1.000 
n « 22 n - 23 
Table 3» Mean assistance scores for sex of sub- 
ject and moral judgment substage in the 
blood donation task (Scores = 0,1,2). 
Substage A    Substage B 
Males 0.833 0.700 
n ■ 20 
Females 0.500 0.174 
n » 22 n = 23 
Analysis of responses to the phone assist task re- 
vealed no significant effects for sex of* subject or 
substage of moral judgment^ There were no significant 
interaction effects (see Table 4). 
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Table 4i Summary table for the analysis of variance of 
•sex of subject and moral judgment substage in 
the phone-assist task. 
Source   , SS df MS P 
A (sex)  1.938 1 1.938 2.870 (ne) 
B 
(substage) 1.431 1 1.431 2.118 (ns) 
A x B    1.339 1 1.339 1.981 (ns) 
S      57.408 
subjects 85 
1
  0.675 
Separate analyses were performed to explore pos- 
sible sex differences in the phone assist task. A jL 
analysis revealed that there were no significant dif- 
ferences between the proportion of males and females 
AT2 
who handed the catalog to the experimenter U.  » 0.58, 
p^.05 (see Table 5) and that there were no significant 
differences between the proportion of substage A and 
substage B subjects' rates of response cA. « 1.36, 
p^.05 (see Table 6). However, further analysis re- 
vealed that females handed the catalog to the experi- 
menter more quickly than the males «*» » 3.92, p^.05 
(see Table 7). 
Analysis of responses to the blood donating task 
revealed a significant effect for sex of subject F4 «- = l»o5 
8.211 (p^rOl) indicating that males were more likely 
to volunteer to donate blood than females. There was 
no significant effect for substage of moral judgment nor 
were there significant interaction effects (see Table 8). 
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Table 5«  Number of males and females who gave the 
catalog to the experimenter and those who 
did not. 
Gave  Didn't Give 
Males   ~2?      15 
* Females     33    f  12 
Table 6\ Number of subjects in Substages A and B who 
responded quickly (first 15 sec.) or slowly 
(last 15 sec.) in phone-assist task. 
Quickly Slowly 
Males 22 12 
Females 14 14 
Table 7«  Number of males and females who responded 
quickly (first 15 sec.) or slowly (last 15 
sec.) in the phone-assist task.' 
Quickly Slowly 
Males *■? 16 
Females 23 10 
Table 8i Summary Table for the analysis of variance of 
sex of subject and moral judgment substage in 
the blood donation task. 
Source     SS     df       MS       F 
A  (sex)         4.089 1 4.089 8.211 ** 
B                     1.169 (substage) 1 1.169 
2.346 
A x B             0.206 1 0.206 0.413 
S                    42.338 (subjects) 85 0.498 
••• PX.01 
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Further analyses were performed to explore possible 
sex differences in the blood donating task. A 3L 
analysis revealed that while a significantly larger 
proportion of male than female subjects promised to 
donate blood £JL = 15.799t P<.005 (see Table 9) 
a larger proportion of females than males actually 
completed their promised donations \j^   *  4.405» 
P<«05 (see Table 10). 
Table 9« Number of males and females who promised 
to donate and who refused to donate blood. 
Promised   Refused 
Male      27       17 
Female      9       36 
Table 10i Number of males and females who donated as 
promised and who did not donate as promised. 
Promised and Did Promised and Didn't 
Males     7 20 
Females     6 3 
Separate analyses were conducted to examine the 
differences in responses across the two prosocial tasks. 
nr2 jL analysis comparing the number of subjects who helped 
in the phone task but not in the blood donation task to 
the number of subjects who helped in the blood donation 
task but did not assist in the phone-assist task revealed 
hO 
that a significantly greater number of persons helped 
in the phone assist task than in the blood donation 
he z 
task oL « 42.32, p^C.OOl (see Table 11). 
Table Hi Number of subjects who gave blood only or 
who handed the catalog to the experimenter only. 
Phone Only   Blood Only 
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Discussion 
The primary research hypothesis stated that per- 
sons demonstrating substage B moral judgment reasoning 
would be more likely to engage in prosocial behaviors 
than persons demonstrating substage A judgment reason- 
ing. This hypothesis was not supported by the data 
from either the phone-assis$ task or the blood donation- 
task. Thus, it appears that substage B of moral judg- 
ment reasoning does not provide added motivation for 
engaging in prosocial (altruistic) behaviors as de- 
fined by the phone-assist or blood donating tasks. 
However, since only two specific tasks were used within 
this study, the tasks selected may not have been suf- 
ficiently representative of minimal or substantial ex- 
penditure prosocial tasks. 
Hypothesis two stated that all subjects would be 
more likely to engage in a minimal expenditure task 
than in a substantial-expenditure prosocial task. 
The data strongly support this trend indicating that 
higher costs to the helper may have negative effects 
upon his or her likelihood to help. 
-Hypothesis three proposed that female subjects 
would be more likely to engage in the phone-assist 
task than their male cohorts. The data'do not support 
this hypothesis. However, the data are supportive of 
hypothesis four which stated that males would be more 
likely than females to promise to engage in the more 
costly task. 
While substage differences were not established 
for the minimal and substantial expenditure prosocial 
tasks selected for this study, the researcher cautions 
against generalising these findings to other prosocial 
behaviors or to other classes of moral behaviors such 
as participating in political demonstrations or con- 
scientiously objecting to fight in wars. It may be that 
the Kohlbergian system is sensitive to behaviors con- 
sonant with the distributive justice notion defined 
earlier but that it is riot a feasible predictor of be- 
haviors . 
The data further suggest that recruiters from 
social service agencies may be cautioned in that high- 
er levels of donations are more likely to be reached 
if the organisation recruits donors to perform tasks 
9 4.2 
requiring the least amount of energy on the part of 
those who donate. For example, it may be more pro- 
fitable to bring the blood mobile to the donors than to 
solicit donors to travel to the blood bank. Likewise* 
in writing a classified ad to solicit volunteers, 
better response rates would result from listing a phone 
number to call rather than an address to  which one must 
write. 
The data analyses concerning the differences in 
response rates between males and females in the phone- 
assist task address the issue of sex-role differentia- 
tion among prosocial tasks. While there were no sig- 
nificant differences between the proportion of males 
and females who helped in the phone task, females re- 
sponded more quickly in handing the catalog to the fe- 
male experimenter than the males. It may be that in 
a minimal expenditure task, females may be influenced 
by a traditional nurturant-female stereotype which then 
functions as a motivator in female helping behaviors 
whereas the influence of this stereotype may have a 
negative effect upon male response rates. This pro- 
posal remains to be tested. 
Data analyses concerning the percentage of actual 
blood donors provides further evidence of a possible 
sex-role stereotype mediator effect upon prosocial be- 
haviors. More males than females volunteered to donate 
*3 
blood, however, the males seldom kept their promises. 
It may be that the male subjects in this study felt 
obligated in the presence of a female investigator to 
say that they would donate blood, thus maintaining the 
traditional brave-male strength role in her eyes whereas 
female subjects did not feel similarly obligated.  In- 
formal conversation with the subjects suggests that 
females who did not donate refused most often on the 
basis of fear of the experience while males responded 
more frequently that they were too busy. Thus, while 
the role of male-appropriate and female-appropriate 
behaviors and stereotypes in prosocia'l behavior is not 
clear at this point, a trend indicating the negative 
r 
influence of male stereotypes upon female behavior and 
positive influence of sex-appropriate stereotypes upon 
all subjects' behaviors does appear to exist. 
Thus, these studies direct future research to the 
following unanswered questions.  First, the relationship 
of substage B of moral judgment to moral behavior must 
be investigated among various populations other than 
college samples so that artifacts of the college subject 
pool may be discounted. Furthermore, before any defi- 
nitive statements may be made concerning the role of 
substage B as a motivator for moral behavior, a broader 
sampling of behaviors must be conducted which extends 
taeyond the particular prosocial tasks used here. It may 
4* 
indeed be the case that the Kohlberg system of moral 
judgment is best attuned to legal and political issues 
such as protest demonstrations, a dimension of moral 
behaviors not sampled here. 
Finally, future research in prosocial solicitation 
must examine the effects of stereotypic traditional 
sex-role models of behavior and their interaction with 
the sex of the experimenter and type of task if defini- 
tive statements are to be made"*conceming the effects 
of social roles upon moral judgments and moral behaviors. 
In conclusion, these studies are consistent with 
the notion that subjects are more likely to engage in 
prosocial tasks which do not require much effort. It. 
also appears that sex-role stereotypes may have a media- 
ting effect upon prosocial behavior. Females responded 
more quickly in a minimal expenditure task in which a fe- 
male experimenter solicited assistance. Furthermore, it 
was revealed that males appear more likely than females 
to promise to engage in more demanding prosocial tasks 
perhaps consistent with brave-male strength roles, however, 
they are not necessarily committed to fulfilling their 
promises in the absence of the female solicitor. Finally, 
while substage B of moral judgment does not appear to 
provide added motivation for participation in prosocial 
tasks, more sampling with multiple classes of subjects 
and tasks must be "-conducted before any definitive state- 
*5 
merits can be made concerning this relationship. 
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Appendix 1 
Questionnaires 
Kohlberg Interview Form A 
57 
Demographic Data Sheet 
Please Provide the following informationi 
Name* ' 
Telephone Numberi , 
Age i  
Number of Brothers t __________ 
Number of Sistersi   
Flease indicate your place in your sibling order 
(check one) 
oldest 
middle 
youngest 
only child 
Religious Affiliation! 
(Check one) *     _______ practicing occasionally 
'-" practicing regularly 
_______ non-practicing 
Are you registered to vote? 
Did you vote in the last election? 
What are your favorite pasttimes? 
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Health Data Sheet 
Name i 
Heightt       Weighti 
Have you been ill recently? 
If you answered "Yes" above, please specify the nature 
and duration of your illnessi 
Are you currently taking any prescribed or over the 
counter medication?   
If you answered "yes" above, please specify the medicationi 
Please answer Yes or No 
Have you ever had hepatitis?        
Have you ever had maleria?   . 
Have you. ever had tuberculosis?    _____ 
Your blood pressure isi 
(check one) generally high 
_______ generally low 
  moderate 
______ I don't know 
Do you sleep well? _______________ 
Do you smoke? (Check one)   often 
    infrequently 
 never ' 
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j**\ 
MORAL JUDGMENT INTERVIEW  FORM A 
Dilemma Hit 
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind 
of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought 
might save her. It was a form of radium that a drug- 
gist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug 
. was expensive to make but the druggist was charging ten 
times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for 
the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the 
drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone 
he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get to- 
__ get her about $1,000, which is half of what it cost. He 
told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him 
to sell it cheaper, or let him pay later. But the drug- 
'i   gist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to 
make money from it." So Heinz gets desperate and con- 
siders breaking into the man's store to steal the drug 
for his wife. 
1. Should Heinz steal the drug? Why or why not? 
2. If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal 
the drug for her? Why or why not? 
3. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a 
stranger. Should Heinz steal the drug for the 
stranger? Why or why not? 
4. Suppose it's a pet animal hie loves. Should Heinz 
steal to save the pet animal? Why or why not? 
5. Is it important for people to do everything they 
can to save another person's life? Why or why not? 
6. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does 
that make it morally wrong? Why or why not? 
7. Should people try to do everything they can to 
obey the law? Why or why not? How does this 
apply to what Heinz should do? 
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Dilemma III'i 
Heinz did break into the store. He stole the drug and 
gave it to his wife. In the newspapers the next day, 
there is an account of the robbery. Mr. Brown, a police 
officer who knew Heinz, read the account. He remembered 
seeing Heinz running away from the store and realized 
that it was Heinz who stole the drug. Mr. Brown wonders 
whetherjie should report that Heinz was the robber. 
1. Should officer Brown report Heinz for stealing? 
Why or Why not? 
2. Officer Brown finds and arrests Heinz. Heinz is 
brought to court, a jury is selected. The jury's 
job is to find whether a person is innocent or 
guilty of committing-a crime. The jury finds Heinz 
guilty. It is up to the judge to determine the 
sentence. Should the judge give Heinz some sentence 
or should he suspend the sentence and let Heinz go 
free?  Why? 
3. Thinking in terms of society, should people who 
break the law be punished? Why or why not? 
How does this apply to how the judge should decide? 
k,      Heinz was doing what his conscience told him when 
he stole the drug. Should a law-breaker be punished 
if he is acting out of conscience? Why or why not? 
6l 
Dilemma It       , 
Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp 
very much. His father promised him he could go if he 
saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard 
at his paper route and saved up the $40 it cost to go 
to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp 
was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of 
his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip and 
Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So 
he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the 
paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp 
so he thinks of refusing to give his father the money. 
1. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? 
Why or" why ...not? 
2. Is the fact that Joe earned the money himself the 
most important thing in the situation? Why or why 
not? 
3. The father promised Joe he could go to camp if he 
earned the money. Is the fact that the father 
promised the most important thing in the situation? 
Why or why not? 
4. Is it important to keep a promise? Why or why not? 
5. Is it important to keep a promise to someone you 
don't know well and probably won't see again? 
Why or why not? 
6. What do you think is the most important thing a son 
should be concerned about in his relationship to 
his father? Why is that the most important thing? 
7. What do you think is the most important thing a 
father should be concerned about in his relationship 
to his son? Why is that the most important thing? 
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